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This paper examines whether solo founders are more likely to succeed in an initial equity
crowdfunding (ECF) campaign and are subsequently less likely to fail than founder teams
for a large sample of initial ECF campaigns conducted on the three largest UK platforms:
Crowdcube, Seedrs and SyndicateRoom. The results show that solo founders have a lower
probability of conducting successful initial ECF offerings than founder teams, and are
also more likely to fail thereafter. The implication that founder teams enjoy more success
is due to the fact that the quality of their human capital may likely attract professional
investors who can act as a certification effect. Likewise, the monitoring role of profes-
sional investors helps to minimize moral hazard concerns and thus lowers the likelihood
of failure for ECF founder teams. The results also establish that founder team human
capital characteristics are significant determinants of initial ECF campaign outcomes
and venture failure.
Introduction
Mike Wright was a pioneering researcher and rec-
ognized expert in many aspects of the nature, role
and financing of high-risk entrepreneurial ven-
tures. He made many seminal contributions to
the new forms of entrepreneurial finance – collec-
tively known as alternative finance – as exemplified
by the Bruton, Khavul, Siegel and Wright (2015)
et al. (2007) overview of recent research in this
field. Equity crowdfunding (ECF) is an excel-
lent example of the latter, as it provides a new
and accessible source of outside equity for small,
young, unlisted startups. Beauhurst (2019) re-
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ports that ECF in the UK raised funds worth
£271m in 2018, or an annual increase of 24.6%
on the previous year, and that ECF platforms
have also increasingly begun to finance later-stage
ventures.1 This can be seen as one response to
the second-stage equity gap – the shortfall be-
tween the amount of (risk) capital that would
be invested under conditions of competitive mar-
kets with full information and the amount of
capital actually invested – a concept that Wright
pioneered with other colleagues (Wilson, Wright
and Kacer, 2018).
Early and growth-stage startups and ventures
are unquoted companies characterized by ex-
treme information asymmetries.2 The founder
1See https://thisisoliver.co/2019/02/05/uk-equity-crowd
funding-continues-its-growth-as-startup-investing-drops/
2Mike Wright has made many seminal contributions in
this area, especially but not only in the context of (aca-
demic) spinoffs (Knockaert et al., 2011; Vanaelst et al.,
2006) and technological entrepreneurship (Mosey and
Wright 2007; Wright et al., 2007).
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team – which may comprise just one person – and
its human capital can be used to signal quality
when seeking outside funding. Only a few ECF
studies examine human capital and how it may
affect ECF campaign success (Barbi and Matti-
oli, 2019; Piva and Rossi-Lamastra, 2018).3 Other
studies show that the founding team has very per-
sistent effects over the lifespan of a venture, includ-
ing on its strategy, success and survival (Agarwal,
Braguinksy and Ohyama, 2020; Fern, Cardinal
and O’Neill, 2012; Greenberg and Mollick, 2018).
Greenberg and Mollick (2018) posit that the
composition of the founding team is perhaps the
most influential decisionmade at the outset by new
startups. They interpret the literature as increas-
ingly focusing on founding teams rather than sole
founders. They note that coordination costs and
incentive problems may arise for startups formed
by a team rather than a sole founder. The empir-
ical results on sole founder versus founder team
are mixed. Early studies find that solo founders
outperform teams (Almus and Nerlinger, 1999;
Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and Woo, 1994), while
some recent studies stress the potential for dis-
agreements, conflicts and disputes within teams
(Agarwal, Braguinksy and Ohyama, 2020; Yang
and Aldrich, 2012). Greenberg andMollick (2018)
find that solo founders outperform founder teams
in terms of survival and do no worse in terms
of revenue generation using a sample of reward-
based crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter.
However, other studies support the superiority of
founder teams (e.g. Lazear, 2005; Levine, Bernard
and Nagel, 2017).
ECF campaigns involve larger target capital
amounts and are subject to more extreme in-
formation asymmetries than reward-based crowd-
funding campaigns (Coakley and Lazos, 2021).
Thus, ventures seek to signal their quality to po-
tential investors by various means, such as prior
external funding or incubators (Ralcheva and
Roosenboom, 2020). In this context, investments
by business angels (BAs) and venture capitalists
(VCs) can act as an important certification effect
for other investors. Zhang et al. (2018) highlight
the growing role of professional (institutional) in-
vestors and estimate that their contribution to UK
3Mochkabadi and Volkmann (2018), in their wide-
ranging review of the ECF literature, make only three
mentions of the term ‘management team’, which illus-
trates the need for further research on this area.
ECF campaign investment increased from 5% in
2015 to 25% in 2016 and 48% in 2017.4 Coak-
ley and Lazos (2021) stress the role of the co-
investment model – where professional investors
invest alongside the crowd – as one of the keys for
the growth and success of the UK ECF market.
Greenberg andMollick (2018) used revenue gen-
eration for their finding that solo founders are
more successful than founder teams in reward-
based crowdfunding. Since startup financial ac-
counts are sketchy, success in ECF studies is
typically measured by startups reaching (exceed-
ing) their target capital in both initial and sea-
soned (follow-on) campaigns (Coakley, Lazos and
Linares-Zegarra, 2021). Barbi and Mattioli (2019)
argue that founding team human capital is proba-
bly the most important aspect that investors pay
attention to when considering funding a com-
pany. Others have argued that it is more im-
portant for early and growth-stage ventures than
for older companies (Colombo and Grilli, 2005;
Unger et al., 2011). However, we are unaware of
any empirical study of this within the ECF litera-
ture.
Thus, the first contribution of this paper is to use
a large sample of ECF campaigns to test Green-
berg and Mollick’s (2018) proposition that solo
founders outperform founder teams in terms of
both initial ECF campaign success and the prob-
ability of subsequent failure. Note, however, that
several entrepreneurial studies stress the impor-
tance of founder teams for professional investors
whose investments can act as a certification effect
for other investors. Crowdcube, the first and largest
UK ECF platform, was aware of this at the out-
set by granting voting rights only to those (pro-
fessional) investors who contributed at or above
a minimum investment threshold such as £10k
(Cumming et al., 2019b). Gompers et al. (2020)
find that VC investors view the management team
as more important than business-related charac-
teristics like product or technology in deal (project)
selection. Capizzi (2015) studies factors that af-
fect BA returns from the Italian market and finds
that the most important characteristic BAs look
for when deciding to invest in a firm is its man-
agement team. Bernstein, Korteweg and Laws
(2017) find that the average BA investor is highly
4Large investment by professional investors leads to po-
tential cascading or herding by crowd investors (Sun,
Coakley and Girardone, 2021; Vismara, 2018).
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responsive to information about the founding
team, but information about the traction and iden-
tity of current investors has less effect.
The paper’s second contribution is to examine
the impact of founder human capital characteris-
tics on initial ECF success and firm failure. While
ECF campaign success and ECF firm failure
have been studied (Coakley, Lazos and Linares-
Zegarra, 2021; Hornuf, Schwienbacher and
Stenzhorn, 2018; Signori and Vismara, 2018),
none of these studies examines the impact of
founders. This requires finding proxies for these
characteristics, which is not straightforward due
to the limited publicly available information of
ECF firms. We follow Barbi and Mattioli’s (2019)
and Piva and Rossi-Lamastra’s (2018) view that
past experience and educational level are the most
salient elements of human capital. We construct
two proxies for experience. On the one hand,
founder team tenure heterogeneity is given by the
tenure range of its members. This can be consid-
ered as part of startup-specific (entrepreneurial)
human capital that represents the breadth of ex-
perience garnered at startup.5 On the other hand,
founder team age heterogeneity, given by its mem-
bers’ age range, can be interpreted as a proxy for
general experience.6 Firms whose founders have
advanced degrees are more likely to receive fund-
ing (Gimmon and Levie, 2010), or to be chosen by
professional investors (Hsu, 2007; Zacharakis and
Meyer, 2000). We use an advanced degree variable
to capture higher educational level achievement
and skills, which are not firm-specific.
Our empirical analysis employs data from 1,291
initial campaigns conducted on the Big 3 UKECF
platforms – Crowdcube, Seedrs and Syndicate-
Room – and establishes two main sets of results.
The first reveals that solo ventures are less likely to
conduct successful initial ECF offerings and are
more likely to experience a failure event relative to
ventures with founder teams. The finding that solo
founders perform worse and are more likely to
fail is contrary to Greenberg and Mollick’s (2018)
results. Our different results may be linked to
the distinct due diligence processes between ECF
and reward-based crowdfunding platforms that
5See Arozamena and Centeno (2006) and Bougheas and
Georgellis (2004) for the role of tenure in specific human
capital.
6See Becker (1964) for differences between general and
specific human capital.
Cumming, Johan and Zhang (2019a) highlight.
Due diligence involves ECF platforms and pro-
fessional investors both interviewing the founding
term and conducting checks on a range of issues
from the founders’ background to the details
of the venture accounts in an effort to reduce
potential adverse selection problems. Our re-
sults can be linked to signalling theory (Spence,
1973), which has been used to explain ECF
campaign success (Ahlers et al., 2015; Vismara,
2016). The general idea is that teams possess
the requisite sets of skills and experience that
help them meet the multifarious challenges in
ECF (Lazear, 2005; Levine, Bernard and Nagel,
2017), which in turn acts as a signal of quality
for investors and for professional investors in
particular.
Our second set of results relate to our human
capital proxies. Our proxies for academic exper-
tise (proxying for higher educational attainment),
firm-specific and general experience are positively
related to successful initial ECF offerings, and also
suggest some evidence of a negative relationship
with venture failure. These human capital results
are consistent with those of Barbi and Mattioli’s
(2019) study of successful campaigns on Crowd-
cube and Piva and Rossi-Lamastra’s (2018) study
of the Italian ECF market. Both establish that en-
trepreneur education and experience affect cam-
paign outcomes, even if they do not focus specif-
ically on team composition. Our human capital
proxy findings can also be linked to the evidence
on heterogeneous teams adduced by Chemmanur
and Paeglis (2005) in their initial public offering
study.
The rest of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. The next section discusses and formulates
the hypotheses to be tested. The third section
gives details of our data and empirical method-
ology. The fourth section reports the results
of multivariate analysis, while the fifth section
concludes.
Background literature and hypothesis
development
This paper employs a signalling theory framework
(Spence, 1973) that has been used successfully to
explain the ECF phenomenon (Ahlers et al., 2015;
Vismara, 2016). A good signal has to be observ-
able and costly to imitate to be effective in reducing
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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information asymmetry, and only high-quality sig-
nallers are able to send effective signals (Connelly
et al., 2011). Ahlers et al. (2015) is the first ECF
study that employs signalling theory to explain
campaign success. They find that retained equity
and making more information available about a
firm’s risks can reduce information asymmetry and
increase the likelihood of success. In a similar vein,
Vismara (2016) finds that there is a negative (pos-
itive) association between equity (entrepreneurs’
social capital) and offering success. Ralcheva and
Roosenboom (2016) extend these studies by fo-
cusing on certification effects in ECF. Their find-
ings reveal that external validation in the form of
grants, the presence of a professional investor and
patents acts as a certification effect that positively
affects campaign success. Johan and Zhang (2020)
argue that entrepreneurs use data and textual in-
formation to signal startup quality. We conjecture
that heterogeneous and highly educated founders
may serve as effective signals that reduce infor-
mation asymmetry and increase the likelihood of
campaign success.
Human capital is highlighted in several ECF
studies and it has been shown to affect offering
success. Barbi and Mattioli (2019) study the UK
market and their findings reveal that education,
experience and gender affect success. Piva and
Rossi-Lamastra (2018) find that entrepreneur ed-
ucation and experience affect campaign outcomes
in the Italian ECF market. In a study that focuses
on post-campaign life, Signori and Vismara (2018)
study factors that affect the likelihood of a firm
conducting at least one follow-on (crowdfunding
or other) campaign and firm failure. They find that
no ECF firm backed by a professional investor
failed. Hornuf, Schwienbacher and Stenzhorn
(2018) study post-campaign life, focusing on the
UK and German ECF market. They argue that
the number of VCs and senior managers increases
the likelihood of follow-on funding, whereas UK
firms are less likely to conduct follow-ons. Their
findings highlight the role of human capital and
the involvement of VCs in firm survival.
There is evidence that teams may perform bet-
ter in ECF because they may signal startup qual-
ity with high potential. Baeck et al. (2014) con-
duct a survey and report that team members may
be more important than the project itself, high-
lighting the signalling role teammembers can play.
Ahlers et al. (2015) find that team sizemay be an ef-
fective signal as it is positively associatedwith cam-
paign success from a set of Australian offerings.
Barbi and Mattioli (2019) focus on human capital
and document a positive association between team
size and total ECF amount raised, employing a
sample of successful Crowdcube offerings. In sum-
mary, the evidence suggests that solo founders may
not possess as much appropriate human capital as
founder teams for ECF success and, as a result, this
may act as a less effective signal for solo startup
quality. High-quality signallers underpin effective
signals. However, Greenberg and Mollick (2018)
find that solo founder reward-based crowdfunding
campaigns perform better in terms of revenue gen-
eration, but they do not test whether they are more
successful than teams in raising funding during ini-
tial ECF campaigns. This leads to the following hy-
pothesis:
H1: ECF ventures with solo founders are more
likely to conduct a successful initial ECF cam-
paign than ventures with founder teams.
There is rather less evidence on ECF firm fail-
ure. Signori and Vismara’s (2018) finding that no
ECF firm backed by a professional investor failed
may be explained by angel and VC investors ac-
tively monitoring startup performance and thus
reducing moral hazard concerns. In addition, an-
gels typically offer business advice. This has a pos-
itive implication for founder teams, as professional
investors tend to focus more on founder teams
than solo founders (Graham, 2006). Greenberg
andMollick (2018) find that solo founders outper-
form founder teams in reward-based crowdfund-
ing in terms of lower failure rates. This motivates
the following hypothesis:
H2: ECF ventures with solo founders are less likely
to fail than ventures with founder teams.
Team size of itself is not necessarily informa-
tive about the human capital characteristics of
the founders. ECF teams operate in a funding
environment where ECF is the most complex type
of crowdfunding, as Wilson and Testoni (2014)
argue. This is because the team has to persuade a
large number of individual investors with differ-
ent characteristics and backgrounds. Thus, since
trying to convince the crowd about the viability
of the venture in ECF campaigns is a complex
task, founder teams can use their human capital
quality to signal potential venture success. Here
we follow Barbi and Mattioli (2019) and Piva and
Rossi-Lamastra (2018) in employing experience
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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and education as proxies for human capital. More
specifically, we employ tenure heterogeneity as a
proxy for firm-specific (entrepreneurship) expe-
rience, age heterogeneity as a proxy for general
experience, and advanced degree as a proxy for
skills which are non-specific to the firms. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: Initial ECF campaign success is positively as-
sociated with team human capital characteristics.
Teams possess a set of diverse skills which could
affect the likelihood of firm failure. Again, we con-
jecture that ventures run by teams with human
capital proxies – like high levels of firm-specific
and general experience and academic expertise –
are less likely to fail. They can also be linked to
team heterogeneity. Jin et al. (2017) document a
positive association between team heterogeneity
and venture performance from a rich dataset of
more than 8,000 observations. Therefore, heteroge-
neous ECF teamsmay possess the requisite diverse
skills to enable their ventures to prosper rather
than fail. This suggests the following hypothesis:
H4: ECF firm failure is inversely associated with
team human capital characteristics.
Data and methodology
Data
Our empirical results are based on a sample
of 1,291 successful and unsuccessful ECF cam-
paigns launched on the three major UK platforms
(Crowdcube, Seedrs and SyndicateRoom) span-
ning the period 2013–2018. The data end in 2018,
as SyndicateRoom changed from being a crowd-
funding platform to become a fund management
firm specializing in startups in 2019. Existing stud-
ies highlight that finding data on founders is diffi-
cult (Roberts and Eesley, 2011). Survivorship bias
may be present, since it is very often difficult to
collect data on firms that operate on the date at
which they are collected (Yang and Aldrich, 2012).
Data unavailability may be one of the reasons why
results are segmented in entrepreneurial finance
(Cumming and Vismara, 2017).
Initial ECF campaign data are obtained from
TAB – formerly Crowdsurfer – which is part of
Eikon app database and described as the most
comprehensive source of intelligence.7 The regis-
tration number – which is a unique identifier for
a UK firm – is used to match TAB data with
founder data from UK Companies House (a gov-
ernment agency acting as the official registrar of
UK firms).8 Thus, we use UK Companies House
to collect data on founders to obtain the largest
dataset possible. This has been deployed in other
ECF studies, such as Signori and Vismara (2018).
We identify a founding team member to be one
listed as Director at UK Companies House.9
Variables
Dependent variables. The set of dependent vari-
ables capturing campaign success are those that
have been used by existing studies. Ln(Amount)
captures the logged total amount raised in the ini-
tial ECF campaign. We also use a dummy that
takes value 1 if a campaign reaches its target, and 0
otherwise. The other campaign success proxy em-
ployed isOverfunding, which aims to capture those
offerings that are overfunded. It takes value 1 if
the total amount raised is greater than the target,
and 0 otherwise. The Failure variable is a dummy
that takes value 1 if the startup has defaulted or is
in administration or liquidation, and 0 otherwise
(Signori and Vismara, 2018). The alternative de-
pendent variable for the Cox and Weibull models
is the time to fail. This is the difference in days be-
tween launch date and failure date for failed cam-
paigns, and launch date and 19 December 2019 for
surviving firms.
7See https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/08/120175-
tab-dashboard-incorporated-eikon-thomson-reuters/
8All firms listed in the UK are obliged by British legisla-
tion annually to file their accounts at Companies House.
This government agency makes available information on
each founder teammember, such as date of appointment,
resignation and date of birth.
9This proxy may not be appropriate in the case of outside
directors. Existing studies indicate that outside directors
are usually appointed after the Series A financing stage
and early-stage investors usually serve as outside directors
(Venugopal and Yeramilli, 2019). Furthermore, issuing
equity for ECF firms is usually the last resort (Walthoff-
Borm, Schwienbacher andVanacker, 2018). Blaseg, Cum-
ming and Koetter (2020) argue that pecking-order theory
holds in ECF and they present some evidence that Ger-
man firms turn to ECF after they have been unsuccessful
at raising equity from professional investors. This makes
it less likely for ECF firms to have directors other than
founding members.
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Explanatory variables. The first explanatory vari-
able is solo founder and takes the value 1 for star-
tups with a solo founder, and 0 otherwise. The
other set of explanatory variables involve human
capital proxies. Tenure heterogeneity, used as a
proxy for firm-specific experience, is defined as the
tenure range of the founder team on the ECF cam-
paign public launch day.Age heterogeneity, used as
a proxy for general experience, is the age range of
team members. The final human capital proxy is
Advanced degree, which is a dummy variable with
value 1 for a founder holding the title of Doctor or
Professor, and 0 otherwise.
Control variables. A set of control variables is
used to account for observed heterogeneity. Firm
age is used since extant studies show that it is
negatively associated with campaign success. We
use a dummy variable called startup, which takes
the value 1 if firm age is equal to or less than
5 years, and 0 otherwise (Steigertahl, Mauer, and
Say (2018). Vulkan, Åstebro and Sierra (2016) re-
port a negative (positive) relation between the goal
(funders) of a campaign and the probability of a
successful ECF campaign. Therefore, startup sta-
tus, target capital and funders are also used as con-
trol variables.
Equity is used as control variable, based on pre-
vious studies suggesting a negative relationship be-
tween equity offered and campaign success (Vis-
mara, 2016). Year dummies, location (i.e. if the
firm is based in London), pre-money valuation and
diversification are also used as control variables.
Bapna (2017) conducts a randomized field experi-
ment and finds that product matters for campaign
success. Different products may be offered across
different industry groups, and therefore a full set
of industry dummies are used in all our empirical
models.
Methodology
The paper employs three success proxies as de-
pendent variables in Eqs (1) to (3) below, where
a solo-founder dummy is the variable of interest.
The amount (raised) is used as dependent variable
in Eq. (1), which is estimated via ordinary least
squares (OLS). Equations (2) and (3) involve es-
timating probit models, where success and over-
funding (amount to goal > 1) dummies are the
dependent variables. To study firm failure, the pa-
per employs the probit (Eq. (4)) and Cox and
Weibull (Eq. (5)) hazard models, as in Hornuf,
Schwienbacher and Stenzhorn (2018). The advan-
tage of hazard models is that they take into ac-
count the time to an event.
Solo founder:
Ln (Amount) = a1 + β1Solo_ f ounder
+ 1Controls+ ε1 (1)
Successdummy = a2 + β2Solo_ f ounder
+ 2Controls+ ε2 (2)
Over f undingdummy = a3 + β3Solo_ f ounder
+ 3Controls+ ε3 (3)
Failuredummy = a4 + β4Solo_ f ounder
+ 4Controls+ ε4 (4)
h1(t|x) = h01 (t) exp[β01Solo_founder
+ 01Controls] (5)
Similar methods are employed when human
capital proxies are used as variables of interest.
These include Tenure heterogeneity, Age hetero-
geneity and Advanced degree. The same set of con-
trols is employed in all equations.
Human capital:
Ln (Amount) = a6 + β6Human_capital
+ 6Controls+ ε6 (6)
Successdummy = a7 + β7Human_capital
+ 7Controls+ ε7 (7)
Over f undingdummy = a8 + β8Human_capital
+ 8Controls+ ε8 (8)
Failuredummy = a9 + β9Human_capital
+ 9Controls+ ε9 (9)
h2(t|x) = h02 (t) exp[β02Human_capital
+ 02Controls] (10)
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Empirical results
This section first reports basic descriptive statistics
for our sample of 1,291 successful and unsuccess-
ful ECF campaigns. It then presents and discusses
the key results of our multivariate empirical anal-
ysis.
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the definitions of the variables em-
ployed in the empirical analysis. The key inde-
pendent variables of interest are the solo-founder
dummy and three human capital proxies. Table 2
presents the basic descriptive statistics for all vari-
ables.
Solo founders account for 34% of our sample.
This is slightly higher than the corresponding 28%
in Greenberg and Mollick’s (2018) sample, imply-
ing that solo ventures are more popular in an ECF
setting. The average team tenure heterogeneity and
age heterogeneity are 1.2 and 9.2 years, respec-
tively. Some 7% of the sample holds an advanced
degree. However, since more than half of founders
work in the IT and technology sector, this may
signal industry-specific expertise. The average pre-
money valuation of sample firms is £3.17m, and
79% of them are equal to or less than 5 years old.
The sample is geographically concentrated, with
46% of firms located in London, which is consis-
tent with Beauhurst (2019). They are mainly undi-
versified (i.e. with a strong focus on a single sector).
The average target capital is £0.32m and the aver-
age equity offered is around 14%.
We conduct an equality of means test for all
variables for solo founders and teams. Table 3 sum-
marizes the results.
There are significant differences between solo
founders and teams for the majority of variables.
Teams are associated with higher success rates and
total amount raised. They are also more likely to
be overfunded and are less likely to fail. All the test
results are significant at the 1% level, which offers
preliminary evidence that goes against H1 andH2.
Teams also set higher targets, enjoy higher valua-
tions for their startups and more funders for their
campaigns.
Next, we test for the presence of multicollinear-
ity among the variables by reporting their corre-
lation coefficients. The results are summarized in
Table 4. The table shows no high correlation be-
tween the variables employed, except for the case
of correlations between funders and campaign
outcomes and human capital, which are to be ex-
pected. For this reason, we analyse human capital
characteristics separately in the following sections.
Success and failure
This subsection focuses on initial campaign suc-
cess and the performance of the venture after the
initial ECF campaign, and specifically whether it
fails. First, we study the effect of solo founder on
three separate proxies for campaign success. Mod-
els (1) to (3) employ the OLS model, in which the
total amount raised or Ln(Amount) is the depen-
dent variable. The remaining six models employ
the probit model, where a success and overfund-
ing dummy are the dependent variables. Three ver-
sions of the model with each dependent variable
are estimated. The first has sole founder as the
only explanatory variable, the second includes only
the control variables, while the third includes all
variables in the previous two regressions. Hereafter
the discussion focuses on regressionmodels (3), (6)
and (9), which include solo founder and the full set
of controls. All three sets of regressions include
both campaign year and industry fixed effects.
Table 5 summarizes the results.
The results indicate that the solo-founder coef-
ficient is significantly negative at the 1% level in
models (3), (6) and (9). Solo-founder firms are neg-
atively related to the natural logarithm of amount
of capital raised, the probability of launching a
successful initial campaign and the probability of
being overfunded. Thus, solo founders are less
likely to raise more capital and succeed in an
initial ECF campaign. In other words, they under-
perform founder teams.
These results strongly reject H1, that solo
founders are more likely to run successful ini-
tial ECF campaigns. They are broadly consistent
with the positive association documented inAhlers
et al. (2015) between team size and campaign suc-
cess. However, the finding that solo founders un-
derperform relative to founder teams runs con-
trary to Greenberg and Mollick’s (2018) findings,
albeit we are using a different performance metric
in a different crowdfunding setting.
Next, we study whether solo founders are more
or less likely to fail. The results are summarized
in Table 6. Models (1) to (3) employ the probit
method, with a failure dummy as the dependent
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Variable definitions
Variable name Description Data source
Dependent variables
Ln(Amount raised) Natural logarithm of total
amount (£) raised in the
initial campaign.
TAB
Success Dummy = 1 if a firm reaches
or exceeds its target before
the campaign closes, and 0
otherwise.
TAB
Overfunding Dummy = 1 if the ratio
amount to goal > 1, and 0
otherwise.
TAB
Failure A binary variable that takes
value 1 if a firm has
defaulted or if it is in
administration or
liquidation, and 0
otherwise.
TAB
Independent variables
Human capital
Solo founder Dummy = 1 for firms with
solo founder, and 0
otherwise.
UK Companies House
Tenure heterogeneity The tenure range in years for
team members at
campaign start. Proxy for
entrepreneurial experience.
UK Companies House
Age heterogeneity Age range of team members
at campaign start. Proxy
for general experience.
UK Companies House
Advanced degree Dummy = 1 if at least one of
the founders holds the title
of Doctor or Professor,
and 0 otherwise.
UK Companies House
Firm-level characteristics
Firm valuation Pre-money valuation (£m)
prior to the crowdfunding
campaign.
TAB
Startup Dummy = 1 if firm age ≤ 5
years at campaign start.
UK Companies House
London Dummy = 1 if firm operates
in London.
UK Companies House
Diversification The number of 4-digit SIC
codes associated with a
firm.
UK Companies House
Campaign characteristics
Equity offered The proportion (%) of equity
offered.
TAB
Ln(Funders) Natural logarithm of the
number of investors at the
end of the campaign.
TAB
Target capital Minimum amount of capital
(£m) to be raised in the
initial campaign.
TAB
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Table 3. Equality of means test between solo founders and teams
Teams (mean) Solo founder (mean) Test for equality of means
Ln(Amount raised) 12.07 11.31 0.76***
Success 0.63 0.5 0.13***
Overfunding 0.59 0.47 0.12***
Firm failure 0.18 0.24 −0.07***
Human capital
Tenure heterogeneity 1.8 0 1.80***
Age heterogeneity 13.83 0 13.83***
Advanced degree 0.11 0.01 0.09***
Firm-level characteristics
Firm valuation (£m) 3.52 2.31 1.22***
Startup 0.77 0.82 −0.05**
London 0.46 0.44 0.02
Diversification 1.19 1.15 0.04
Campaign characteristics
Equity offered (%) 14.12 14.16 −0.04
Ln(Funders) 4.61 4.33 0.28***
Target capital (£m) 0.37 0.23 0.14***
This table reports the results of an equality of means test. The teams column reports the average values of teams, whereas the solo
founders column reports the average values for solo founders. The last column reports their difference, along with their significance
levels. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The sample involves initial offerings
conducted on Crowdcube, Seedrs and SyndicateRoom and spans the period from January 2013 to December 2018.
variable. Models (4) to (9) employ the Cox and
Weibull hazard models, that take account of the
time to failure. Hazard ratios are reported for these
models.
The findings reveal positive and significant
marginal effects (probit models) and hazard ratios
higher than 1 (Cox and Weibull hazard models)
at the 1% level. The robust finding is that solo-
founder campaigns are more likely to fail. Solo-
founder offerings exhibit a higher hazard ratio of
time to fail of around 34% compared to those of
founder teams inmodels (6) and (9). These findings
roundly reject H2 that solo-founder campaigns are
less likely to fail. This may partly be due to the
monitoring activities of professional investors in
most ECF campaigns with founder teams. They
also lend support to existing studies, which indi-
cate that teams possess a wider set of skills that
makes it more likely for them to survive (Levine,
Bernard and Nagel, 2017). They are also broadly
consistent with themeta-analysis study of Jin et al.
(2017), in which a positive association is docu-
mented between team size and venture success.
Our results are contrary to the positive as-
sociation between solo founders and firm sur-
vival documented by Greenberg and Mollick
(2018) for a sample of reward-based crowdfund-
ing campaigns on Kickstarter. Cumming, Johan
and Zhang (2019a) find that ECF platforms are
more likely to conduct due diligence (including
background checks on the entrepreneurial team)
to avoid adverse selection problems compared to
donation- and reward-based platforms. Moreover,
BAs andVCs are not as heavily involved in reward-
based campaigns as they are in UK ECF cam-
paigns. Zhang et al. (2018) found that the aver-
age share of professional investors’ contribution
to ECF campaigns had reached an average of
48% in 2017, and so acted as a certification ef-
fect for other investors. This supports the concept
of the wisdom of the crowd (Astebro et al., 2019;
Mollick andNanda, 2015) in explaining the higher
success of founder team ECF campaigns. The re-
sults on lower probability of founder team firm
failure link with Signori and Vismara’s (2018) find-
ing that founder teams with a professional investor
are less likely to fail. This is consistent with profes-
sional investors playing a monitoring role to mini-
mize moral hazard concerns.
Propensity score matching. Endogeneity is an im-
portant concern in any study in management
and business research (Abdallah, Goergen and
O’Sullivan, 2015). We note that our sample in-
cludes data on both successful and unsuccess-
ful ECF campaigns, which should be helpful
in ameliorating sample selection concerns. How-
ever, our study may still be potentially biased
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Table 7. Propensity score matching: average treatment effect on the treated of being a solo founder on the likelihood of initial campaign
success and firm failure
Initial campaign outcomes Firm failure (D = 1)
Success (D = 1) Overfunding
Panel A: One match per observation
ATET −0.147*** −0.140*** 0.082**
(−3.71) (−3.49) (2.56)
N 1,169 1,169 1,169
Panel B: Three matches per observation
ATET −0.129*** −0.129*** 0.072**
(−3.80) (−3.71) (2.55)
N 1,169 1,169 1,169
Panel C: Five matches per observation
ATET −0.128*** −0.123*** 0.069***
(−3.89) (−3.65) (2.59)
N 1,169 1,169 1,169
This table shows the computation of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). That is the effect, on average, of being a
solo-founder firm on the likelihood of being successful or failing. We match solo-founder firms with one, three and five corresponding
team-based firms based on pre-money valuation, startup status, location (London), campaign goal and campaign year. A logistic
model was used to predict each firm’s propensity score. Abadie and Imbens robust standard errors are used; z statistics are reported in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
if, ex-ante, solo founders are less likely to be
successful or more likely to fail than founder
teams with comparable characteristics. We follow
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in using propensity
score matching (PSM) as a means of addressing
such concerns. This method has been employed
in other ECF studies to confront endogeneity
(Vismara, 2019; Walthoff-Borm, Schwienbacher
and Vanacker, 2018).
Matching restricts inference to the sample of
solo founders (the treatment group) and teams (the
control group). The treatment group is matched
with the control group on the basis of a propen-
sity score that is a function of a firm’s observable
characteristics. We match firms based on the near-
est neighbour available. Propensity scores are es-
timated via a logit model utilizing firms’ observ-
able characteristics: pre-money valuation, startup
status, location (London), campaign funding goal
and campaign year. We match solo-founder firms
with one, three and five corresponding (nearest-
neighbour) firms with a founder team.10 To ver-
ify the quality of matching, Appendix Figure A2
10Stata 16’s ‘teffects overlap’ routine was used to produce
density plots to check whether the overlap assumption is
violated. Appendix Figure A1 in the online supporting in-
formation displays the estimated density of the predicted
probabilities that an untreated firm is assigned to treat-
ment and the estimated density of the predicted probabili-
ties that a treated firm is assigned to treatment. Consistent
shows the distribution of the propensity score for
both groups before and after matching, and sug-
gests that the matches are satisfactory.
We present the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATET) in Table 7.We observe that ATETs
are significantly negative for the case of initial
campaign success and overfunding, while they are
significantly positive for venture failure. For exam-
ple, consider the results in Panel A. On average, the
effect of being a solo founder decreases (increases)
the likelihood of success (failure) by around 14%
(8.2%) compared with what would have occurred
if these firms had founder teams. These results are
consistent with those obtained previously.
The role of human capital proxies
This section studies the relationship between hu-
man capital proxies and campaign success/firm
failure. We follow a similar approach to that in Ta-
ble 5, and the results are summarized in Table 8.
The results suggest a significantly positive asso-
ciation at the 1% level between tenure heterogene-
ity and the amount raised, a success dummy and
an overfunding dummy in models (1), (4) and (7),
with the overlap assumption, the estimated density plots
have considerable mass in the regions where they overlap,
little mass around 0 and little mass around 1. Thus, there
is no evidence that the overlap assumption is violated.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
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respectively. A possible explanation may be that
this variable sends a strong positive signal about
startup-specific experience to potential investors
that may reduce information asymmetries and in-
crease the likelihood of campaign success. Age het-
erogeneity is significantly positive at the 5% level or
better in models (2), (5) and (8), respectively. Fi-
nally, advanced degree is significantly positive at
the 1% level, respectively, in models (3), (6) and (9),
respectively. These results strongly supportH3 that
initial ECF campaign success is positively associ-
ated with founder team human capital character-
istics.
We also investigate the effects of human capital
proxies on venture failure. We follow a similar ap-
proach to that in Table 6 for campaign failure, and
the results are summarized in Table 9.
The results suggest that tenure heterogeneity is
negatively related to firm failure. The probit coef-
ficient is negative and significant at 5% [model (1)]
and the Cox hazard ratio is lower than 1 and sig-
nificant at 10% (model 4). Age heterogeneity ex-
hibits a similar pattern, suggesting an inverse re-
lationship between age heterogeneity and venture
failure [models (2), (5) and (8)]. Finally, advanced
degree has no significant effect on firm failure. The
marginal effects and hazard ratios are insignificant
in models (3), (6) and (9).
Overall, our findings provide some empirical ev-
idence in support of H4. ECF firm failure (time
to fail) is inversely associated with team human
capital characteristics, except for the advanced de-
gree variable, where the probit and hazard ratios
are statistically insignificant across models. They
lend support to the argument presented in Wilson
and Testoni (2014) that ECF is the most complex
type of crowdfunding, given that heterogeneous
teams perform better when they have to face com-
plex tasks (Carpenter, 2002). The findings are con-
sistent with the meta-analysis study of Jin et al.
(2017), in which diversity positively affects venture
success. Finally, they are also consistent with Choi
et al. (2021), in which human capital affects gen-
eral startup performance in the US market.
Conclusions
This study extends the existing ECF literature by
focusing on the relations between founder team
structure (solo founders vs. teams), human capi-
tal characteristics, initial ECF campaign success
and firm failure, using campaign and ECF firm
data from Crowdcube, Seedrs and SyndicateRoom
for the period from January 2013 to December
2018. It investigates for the first time whether solo
founders outperform teams in terms of enjoying a
greater degree of success in ECF campaigns and
subsequently being less likely to fail, as argued by
Greenberg and Mollick (2018) for their reward-
based crowdfunding sample. Our results indicate
that solo ventures are less likely to conduct suc-
cessful initial campaigns and, moreover, that such
ventures are more likely to fail afterwards. These
are novel findings that could be explained by the
fact that founder teams may be more likely to at-
tract professional investors like BAs that act as a
certification effect for crowd investors (Vismara,
2018). Our study also investigates the effect of hu-
man capital characteristics on ECF initial cam-
paign success and firm failure. The results reveal
that heterogeneity and holding an advanced de-
gree may be effective signals that can reduce infor-
mation asymmetry and increase the likelihood of
success. This extends existing studies that focus on
human capital in ECF (Barbi and Mattioli, 2019;
Piva and Rossi-Lamastra, 2018). Our findings also
provide some evidence that founder human capital
characteristics matter for firm failure.
Our study suggests that founder teams outper-
form solo ventures in equity crowdfunding and,
thus, that equity crowdfunding is distinct in this re-
spect from reward-based crowdfunding. The the-
oretical implication of our study is that founder
teams enjoy more success because the quality of
their human capital can allay information asym-
metries by attracting professional investors, where
the latter act as a certification effect for other
investors. Likewise, the monitoring role of profes-
sional investors helps to minimize moral hazard
concerns and thus lower the likelihood of failure
for ECF founder teams. As for practical implica-
tions, our findings suggest that platforms could
improve their due diligence process by focusing
more on the human capital of the founder team.
This may help create a sustainable and flourishing
ECFmarket that could help in filtering out lemons
(Akerlof, 1970).
As with any study, ours comes with limitations.
One interesting topic for further study may be how
the interpretation of solo founder and human cap-
ital signals varies across different investors. Signals
may be interpreted differently across crowd mem-
bers (Vanacker and Forbes, 2016), while others
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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have suggested that investment behaviour is het-
erogeneous in ECF campaigns (e.g. Wallmeroth,
2019). It may also be interesting to investigate
Vismara’s (2019) distinction between experienced
and inexperienced investors. He argues that the
former follow a market logic whereas the latter fol-
low a community logic.
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